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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Chancellor Scott Baker appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for 
credit for time served. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Nampa Police Department Officer Arnold responded to Mercy Medical Center 
regarding a reported battery.  (Exs., p.2.)1  A patient in the Emergency Room had stated 
he had been handcuffed, blindfolded, and beaten with a bat.  (Exs., p.2.)  Officer Arnold 
contacted the patient, Thomas Debban, and saw blood on his clothing.  (See Exs., p.2.)  
Mr. Debban had a three-to-four-inch laceration and bruises on his face.  (Exs., p.2.)   
 Mr. Debban stated his ex-girlfriend, Christina Harris, picked him up and took him 
to her residence, where they planned to hang out and drink a few beers.  (Exs., pp.2-3.)  
He reported that when they arrived, he saw a man and woman, later identified as 
Mr. Baker and Alisha Ritz-Baker, sitting in the kitchen.  (Exs., p.3.)  Mr. Debban stated 
Mr. Baker came at him with a bat and began kneeing him and punching him in the face.  
(Exs., p.3.)  Mr. Debban also stated Mr. Baker handcuffed him and taped a rag in his 
mouth.  (Exs., p.3.)  Mr. Debban reported he was placed in a vehicle and taken to 
another location, where Ms. Ritz-Baker beat him all over with the bat.  (Exs., p.3.)  
Mr. Debban was eventually able to convince Mr. Baker to take him home.  (Exs., p.3.) 
 Mr. Debban stated he and Mr. Baker were old friends who had met in prison, but 
had since cut ties and more recently had differences regarding a female.  (Exs., p.3.)  
Detective Cain interviewed Ms. Harris, who stated she had brought Mr. Debban to her 
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residence knowing that Mr. Baker and Ms. Ritz-Baker planned to “rough” him up.  
(Exs., p.3.)  When Detective Cain tried to interview Mr. Baker and Ms. Ritz-Baker, they 
requested attorneys.  (Exs., p.3.) 
 On May 12, 2008, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Baker with one 
count of aiding and abetting aggravated battery, felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-903(b), 
18-907(b), and 18-204, and one count of kidnapping in the first degree, felony, 
I.C. §§ 18-4501 and 18-4502.  (R., pp.33-34.)  Mr. Baker entered a not guilty plea.  
(R., pp.35-36.)  Mr. Baker posted bail and was released.  (R., p.497.)  On August 4, 
2008, Mr. Baker was not personally present for the scheduled status conference, that 
day the district court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.  (R., pp.47-48, 65-66.) 
 In the Order on Motion for Credit for Time Served entered in this case, the district 
court found Mr. Baker was arrested in Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada, on or about 
August 20, 2008.  (See R., p.499.)  Mr. Baker had been arrested initially in connection 
with a hit and run accident, and later he was charged with providing false information.  
(R., p.499.)   
 On September 8, 2008, Citizenship and Immigration Canada issued a Report 
Under Subsection 44(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.  (Exs., p.137 
(Def. Ex. B).)  The report opined that Mr. Baker was “inadmissible pursuant to . . . 
Paragraph 36(2)(A) in that there are reasonable grounds to believe [he] is a foreign 
national who is inadmissible on grounds of criminality for having been convicted in 
Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by way of indictment.”  
(Exs., p.137.)  The report also stated Mr. Baker, on September 5, 2008, had been 
                                                                                                                                            
1 All citations to “Exs.” refer to the 137-page PDF electronic document containing the 
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convicted at Saint John Provincial Court “under CC354(1)(A) and CC403(A)—both 
indictable offences—and sentenced to 1 day in jail concurrent for each offence on top of 
18 days under remand.”  (Exs., p.137.)  The same day, Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada entered a Deportation Order against Mr. Baker.  (Exs., p.139.) 
 Mr. Baker later pleaded guilty to an assault charge in Canada.  (R., p.499.)  The 
district court here found “[t]he assault charge in Canada involved a different victim on a 
different date under different circumstances than the events giving rise to the Idaho 
charges.”  (R., p.499.)  The Canadian court sentenced Mr. Baker to serve two years and 
ten months for assault.  (R., p.499.)  The district court here stated, “[n]o evidence was 
submitted concerning the date of Mr. Baker’s Canadian sentencing.”  (R., p.500.)   
 On July 1, 2009, Citizenship and Immigration Canada entered another 
Deportation Order against Mr. Baker, based on the opinion that “there are reasonable 
grounds to believe [he] is a permanent resident or a foreign national who is inadmissible 
on grounds of serious criminality for having been convicted in Canada of an offence 
under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months 
had been imposed.”  (Exs., p.138.) 
 On August 13, 2009, Deputy Jana Vertrees, the Extradition Coordinator at the 
Canyon County Sheriff’s Office, sent a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet regarding 
Mr. Baker to Melanie Megeney in Springhill, Nova Scotia, Canada.  (Exs., p.136 
(Def. Ex. A).) Deputy Vertrees stated the Canyon County Sheriff’s Office had “(2) active 
felony warrants for which I would like to place a formal detainer on this subject.”  
(Exs., p.136.)  She further stated, “Canyon County does intend to extradite on these two 
                                                                                                                                            
presentence report and other exhibits. 
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warrants, and I ask that you go through Donna MacKenzie when the time comes for the 
extradition arrangements.”  (Exs., p.136.)   
 With the cover sheet, Deputy Vertrees sent copies of the warrants in this case 
and in Canyon County CR 2008-7708/CR 2008-7653, a case involving two counts of 
aggravated assault.  (See Exs., p.136.)  Additionally, Deputy Vertrees sent a report to 
“assist you in your efforts to determine the level of incarceration that [Mr. Baker] might 
be placed in.”  (Exs., p.136.)   
 The district court in this case found “Mr. Baker completed his sentence on the 
Canadian criminal matters on June 3, 2011 . . . .  At that time he was picked up at the 
prison by the Canadian immigration authorities and was immediately transported by 
them to the Canadian/U.S. border.”  (R., p.500.)  Mr. Baker was released into the 
custody of a representative of the Washington County, Maine sheriff’s office at the 
border.  (R., p.500.)  The district court found Mr. Baker “was then taken to the town of 
Machias, Maine, and was served with the warrant of arrest issued by the Canyon 
County Court in this matter.”  (R., p.500; see R., pp.421-23 (return of service from 
Washington County (Maine) Sheriff’s Office).) 
 Mr. Baker’s arraignment in this case happened on June 15, 2011.  (R., p.67.)  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Baker later agreed to plead guilty to the aiding and 
abetting aggravated battery count in this case, and the State agreed to dismiss the 
kidnapping count.  (See R., p.86.)  Mr. Baker also agreed to plead guilty to one of the 
counts of aggravated assault in No. CR 2008-7708, and the State agreed to dismiss the 
other count.  (R., p.86.)  Mr. Baker agreed to waive his right to challenge any sentence 
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which had been within the statutory framework.  (R., p.87.)  The district court accepted 
Mr. Baker’s guilty pleas.  (R., pp.89-93.) 
 On November 14, 2011, the district court in this case imposed a unified sentence 
of fifteen years, with seven years fixed.  (R., pp.298-301, 315-16.)  The sentence would 
run consecutively to the sentence imposed in No. CR 2008-7708, where the district 
court imposed a sentence of five years indeterminate.  (R., p.315; see R., p.301.)  The 
district court gave Mr. Baker “credit for two hundred and one (201) days of incarceration 
prior to the entry of judgment for this offense (or included offense) pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 18-309.”  (R., p.316.) 
 About four years later, Mr. Baker filed, pro se, a Motion for Credit Time Served.  
(R., pp.411-42.)  Mr. Baker asserted he “was arrested in Canada on or about 
September 8, 2008.  The defendant was charged with a crime in Canada, however [he] 
was denied bail and his sentence was enhanced due to the detainer in the United 
States, Idaho.”  Mr. Baker requested “credit for the time spent in custody from 
September 8, 2008 until June 2, 2011, which he is legally entitled [to], as a matter of 
law.”  (R., p.411.)  He reiterated that he “was denied bail due to the outstanding charges 
in Idaho,” and “[d]uring sentencing in Canada, the [defendant’s] sentence was 
enhanced due to the charges pending in Idaho.”  (R., p.411.) 
 The State filed an Objection to Motion for Credit for Time Served.  (R., pp.415-
18.)  The State argued Mr. Baker “has failed to provide any evidence to support his 
claim and cites no authority that supports his argument that he is entitled to credit for 
time served.”  (R., p.416.)  It contended he “is not entitled to credit for time he served in 
Canada on another case.”  (R., p.416.)  The State argued Mr. Baker “was incarcerated 
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in Canada on an unrelated charge, assault causing bodily harm, which originated in 
Canada.  Additionally, the defendant was not being held on a warrant from this case 
and there is no evidence that a detainer was filed against the defendant.”  (R., p.417.) 
 The district court later conducted a hearing on the motion for credit for time 
served.  (R., pp.487-92.)  Mr. Baker testified he had been served with a copy of the 
arrest warrant in this case by a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer on the day he 
was arrested in Canada in August 2008.  (Tr., p.22, L.7 – p.24, L.22.)  Mr. Baker also 
testified he had been denied bail in his Canadian bail hearings because of his 
outstanding charges in Idaho.  (Tr., p.25, L.17 – p.26, L.11.)  Further, according to 
Mr. Baker, at his sentencing for the assault charge in Canada, the judge admonished 
him “because she said I committed violent acts in Idaho and bailed out of jail and came 
to her country and committed more violent acts and said that she was going to make an 
example out of me so that when I come back to America that they’d know that Canada 
doesn’t tolerate violence.”  (Tr., p.26, L.12 – p.27, L.5.) 
 Deputy Vertrees testified she never sent a copy of the warrant to Canada to be 
served on Mr. Baker, nor did she ask Canada to serve Mr. Baker with a copy of the 
warrant.  (Tr., p.43, Ls.10-19.)  She had not received a copy of the warrant indicating it 
had been served on Mr. Baker in Canada.  (Tr., p.44, Ls.18-22.)  Deputy Vertrees 
testified she had received a copy of the warrant indicating it had been served on 
Mr. Baker in Maine on June 3, 2011.  (Tr., p.44, L.22 – p.45, L.16.) 
 On cross-examination, Deputy Vertrees testified that a detainer “is simply a hold.  
You’re just requesting that they keep record of your interest in the subject.  It is not a 
service of a warrant at all.”  (Tr., p.53, Ls.8-10.)  She testified Mr. Baker could have 
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been free to leave if he had been released on his Canadian charges at the time.  
(Tr., p.53, Ls.11-16.)   
 Mr. Baker asserted his testimony that he had been served with a warrant in 
August of 2008 had not really been countered by the State.  (Tr., p.60, L.22 – p.61, L.6.)  
He also asserted that once the detainer was placed on him on August 13, 2009, he was 
not free to be released and was being held on the Idaho charges.  (Tr., p.61, Ls.17-20.) 
 Based on State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68 (Ct. App. 2005), the State argued 
Mr. Baker had not shown his prejudgment incarceration in Canada was attributable to or 
a consequence of the charges in this case.  (Tr., p.63, Ls.13-24.)  Thus, the State 
argued he was not entitled to credit for time served.  (Tr., p.63, L.25.)  The State 
contended the detainer was not sufficient to entitle Mr. Baker to credit for time served in 
Canada “because he was not being held pursuant to the detainer.”  (Tr., p.64, Ls.19-
24.)  Further, the State characterized Mr. Baker’s testimony as a “bare allegation that he 
was served with a warrant without any corroboration.”  (Tr., p.65, Ls.18-19.) 
 The district court later entered an Order on Motion for Credit for Time Served.  
(R., pp.496-507.)  The district court found the detainer documents “were only holding 
documents wherein a request was made to another authority to maintain a record of the 
requesting entity’s interest in the subject.”  (R., p.501.)  The district court concluded 
Mr. Baker “is not entitled to credit for the days served in Canada on unrelated criminal 
charges.”  (R., p.504.)  The district court stated “the record does not demonstrate that 
Mr. Baker was ever held on the Idaho charges in Canada, or that he was served with 
the arrest warrant in this case by Canadian authorities.”   (R., p.504.)  Rather, the 
district court determined “Mr. Baker was served with the warrant of arrest in this case 
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not by any Canadian authority, but instead by the Washington County, Maine Sheriff’s 
Department on the same date that he was released from Canadian prison.”  (R., p.504.) 
 The district court stated that “[a]lthough Mr. Baker presented testimony that he 
was in custody on the warrant in Canada and that is why he was not allowed to post bail 
during the pendency of his Canadian charges, there is no record to support that 
allegation and the Court is not persuaded by the Defendant’s testimony.”  (R., pp.504-
05.)  As the district court put it, the courts in Canada could have considered Mr. Baker’s 
jumping bail when determining his custody status while the charges were pending, and 
could have considered information about his prior record at sentencing.  (R., p.505.)  
The district court continued: “However, the entire time Mr. Baker was in Canadian 
custody, he was either charged with a Canadian crime or convicted and sentence for a 
Canadian crime.  The entirety of his incarceration was attributed to another, unrelated 
criminal case up to June 3, 2011, the date the warrant of arrest in this matter was 
served.”  (R., p.505.)  Thus, the district court denied the motion for credit for time 
served.  (R., p.505.) 
 The district court determined Mr. Baker was entitled to credit for time served for 
the period between his return to the United States and his sentencing in Idaho, and for 
the period between his initial arrest and his posting bail in 2008.  (R., p.505.)  The 
district court determined the total credit for those periods was 201 days, which had been 
granted in Mr. Baker’s judgment.  (See R., p.505.) 
 Mr. Baker filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order on 




Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Baker’s motion for credit for time served? 
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ARGUMENT 





 Mr. Baker asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion for credit for 
time served. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time 
served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free 
review by the appellate courts.”  State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, ___, 373 P.3d 699, 702 
(2016) (quoting State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68 (Ct. App. 2005)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  An appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact, unless those 
findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are 
therefore clearly erroneous.  State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53 (1998). 
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Baker’s Motion For Credit For 
Time Served 
 
 Mr. Baker asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion for credit for 
time served. 
 Under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, “[a] motion to correct a court’s computation of 
credit for time served, granted pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-309 or 19-2603, may 
be made at any time.”  I.C.R. 35(c).  Idaho Code § 18-309, which governs the award of 
credit for prejudgment time served, provides in relevant part: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any period 
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of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the 
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. . . .  
 
I.C. § 18-309(1). 
 The Idaho Court of Appeals has held “[t]he statute’s phrase ‘if such incarceration 
was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered’ means 
that the right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a 
consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence is 
imposed.”  Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68) (citing State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850 
(Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765 (Ct. App. 1989)) (emphases in 
original).  The Vasquez Court held “there must be a causal effect between the offense 
and the incarceration in order for the incarceration to be ‘for’ the offense, as the term is 
used in I.C. § 18-309.”  Id.   
 In Vasquez, the Court held the defendant “was already serving time in one 
county (Payette) when he was served with an arrest warrant from another county 
(Washington) on unrelated charges.  The Washington charges, therefore, had no effect 
upon [the defendant’s] liberty because he was already subject to confinement for 
charges arising in Payette County.”  Id.  The Vasquez Court therefore held the 
defendant “was not entitled to credit on his Washington County sentences for time 
served in Payette County.”  Id. at 69. 
 Mindful of the language of I.C. § 18-309 and Vasquez, Mr. Baker asserts the 
district court erred when it denied his motion for credit for time served.  As Mr. Baker 
asserted during the hearing on the motion, once the detainer was in place as of August 
13, 2009, Mr. Baker “was not free to be released, he was being held on the Idaho 
charges, and, in fact, he was not released.”  (See Tr., p.61, Ls.17-20.)  Mr. Baker 
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asserted “from August 13, 2009, he was in Idaho’s custody.”  (See Tr., p.62, Ls.5-6.)  
He “was not free to leave because of the Idaho detainer.”  (See Tr., p.62, Ls.20-21.)  
Thus, Mr. Baker asserted I.C. § 18-309 had been satisfied because “[t]here is a causal 
effect.  He was kept in custody. . . .  [H]e was being held on the Idaho charges and 
could not get out of custody due to that detainer from then on.”  (See Tr., p.66, Ls.10-
17.)  Mr. Baker therefore submits the district court erred when it denied his motion for 
credit for time served.  See I.C. § 18-309(1); Taylor, 160 Idaho at ___, 373 P.3d at 702.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Mr. Baker respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
district court’s Order on Motion for Credit for Time Served and remand the case for 
entry of an order granting Mr. Baker all the credit to which he is entitled. 
 DATED this 19th day of October, 2016. 
 
      _________/s/________________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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